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Standards, Patents, and the 
National Smart Grid 
 
Jorge L. Contreras* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Since the 1970s, energy independence, conservation, and 
environmental preservation in the United States have been 
recognized as urgent national priorities. In recent years, this 
concern has only increased. In 2003 the Department of Energy 
warned that “[u]nprecedented levels of risk and uncertainty 
about future conditions in the electric industry have raised 
concerns about the ability of the system to meet future needs.”1 
Responding to this call for action, Congress enacted the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),2 implementing 
a sweeping new national energy policy.3 EISA mandates the 
modernization of the century-old national power grid that is 
“aging, inefficient, and congested.”4 To do this, it calls for the 
creation of a “Smart Grid” that will dramatically improve the 
reliability, efficiency, security, and cost-effectiveness of the 
national electric grid.5 Among the key provisions of EISA is a 
requirement that standards be developed to enable 
 
  * Associate Professor of Law, American University – Washington College 
of Law. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Annual Meeting on October 
20, 2011. Many thanks to Dieter Ernst for his helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 
1. OFFICE OF ELEC. TRANSMISSION & DISTRIB., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 
“GRID 2030”: A NATIONAL VISION FOR ELECTRICITY’S SECOND 100 YEARS, iv 
(2003) [hereinafter GRID 2030 REPORT], available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/files/20050608125055-grid-2030.pdf. 
2. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
121 Stat. 1492. 
3. For example, in addition to the electrical grid, EISA addresses issues 
ranging from vehicle fuel economy to home appliance and lighting efficiency, 
to oil and gas industry tax subsidies. Id. 
4. GRID 2030 REPORT, supra note 1, at iii. 
5. Energy Independence and Security Act § 1301, 121 Stat. at 1783-84. 
1
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interoperability among the many different components that 
will be necessary to implement the Smart Grid infrastructure.6 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) is charged with overseeing the identification and 
selection of the hundreds of standards that will be required to 
implement the massive Smart Grid project.7 This critical work 
has begun, and the first standards have already been selected 
for inclusion in NIST’s Smart Grid catalog.8 However, the 
benefits that could be realized from Smart Grid 
standardization could be threatened by a growing number of 
patents that cover Smart Grid architecture and technologies.9 
If patents that cover standardized Smart Grid elements are not 
revealed until technology is broadly distributed throughout the 
network (“locked-in”), significant disruption could occur if 
patent holders sought to collect unanticipated rents from large 
segments of the market.10 Moreover, even if patents are 
revealed early in the standardization process, there is currently 
no efficient way for market participants to assess the cost of 
implementing the standardized technologies covered by these 
patents before those technologies and associated costs are 
locked-in to the system.11 As a result, costs to consumers could 
increase, competitors could be shut out from the market, and 
the standardization process itself could be subverted. And far 
from being hypothetical, each of these scenarios has arguably 
already occurred in industries that rely heavily on 
standardization, such as computer memory and 
 
6. § 1305, 121 Stat. at 1787-88. 
7. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NIST 
SPECIAL PUBL’N NO. 1108, NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID 
INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS RELEASE 1.0, 7 (2010) [hereinafter NIST 
FRAMEWORK 1.0]. 
8. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. Standards & Tech., Smart Grid Panel 
Approves Six Standards for Catalog (Jul. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/sgip-072611.cfm. 
9. Jorge L. Contreras, Standards and Related Intellectual Property 
Issues for Climate Change Technology 13-14 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-02-05, 
2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1756283. 
10. Id. at 16. 
11. See id. at 16-17, 20-21. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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telecommunications.12 In the case of the Smart Grid, however, 
the risk is even greater, as Smart Grid standards are 
mandated by law and have the potential to be adopted into 
both federal and state regulation, making lock-in nearly 
impossible to avoid and providing even greater leverage to 
opportunistic patent holders. 
The U.S. federal government has in recent years adopted a 
relatively hands-off approach to the development of technical 
standards, deferring in large part to the efforts of privately-
organized standardization efforts.13 Such deference has 
characterized both federal procurement and agency rulemaking 
activity.14 By the same token, the federal government has 
recognized a number of key technology areas in which the 
federal government should take a “convening and/or active-
engagement role” to “ensure a rapid, coherent response to 
national challenges.”15 One of these areas is the Smart Grid. 
Given the critical importance of the Smart Grid, it is 
imperative that the governmental agencies overseeing the 
identification and development of Smart Grid standards take 
appropriate measures to ensure that broad, national 
 
12. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 644-47 (2007); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things 
to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 
149 (2007). 
13. See Memorandum from Aneesh Chopra, Miriam Sapiro & Carl 
Shapiro to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter OSTP Principles for Federal Engagment], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-
08_1.pdf (noting that “reliance on private sector leadership, supplemented by 
Federal Government contributions to discrete standardization processes . . . 
remains the primary strategy for government engagement in standards 
development” and that “all standards activities should involve the private 
sector”). As observed in a 1992 report by the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), “The U.S. standards setting process reflects a 
strong political and cultural bias in favor of the marketplace, a preference 
that has its origins deep in American history.” OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, TCT-512, GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING 
BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 14 (1992), available at 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9220.pdf. 
14. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-119 REVISED, 
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY 
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (1998), 
available at http://standards.gov/a119.cfm. 
15. OSTP Principles for Federal Engagement, supra note 13, at 3. 
3
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implementation of standardized Smart Grid technology is not 
hindered either by undue economic burdens or the threat of 
costly and disruptive litigation.16 To this end, in this Article I 
lay out a number of legal options available to the U.S. federal 
government for addressing potential patent encumbrances on 
Smart Grid standards. These range from relatively modest 
measures such as priority-setting within existing regulatory 
frameworks to more interventionist approaches, such as federal 
march-in rights, compulsory licensing, legislative exclusions of 
injunctive relief and the formation of patent pools. It is hoped 
that this brief catalog of options will offer useful assistance to 
federal policy makers seeking to preserve this strategic 
national resource. 
 
II.  The U.S. Electrical Power Grid and the Need for a 
Smart(er) Grid 
 
A. The Grid Today.  
 
The electrical power that is available for public use in the 
United States17 is produced by a decentralized network of more 
than nine thousand generating facilities that are 
interconnected in a national power transmission “grid.”18 
 
16. This Article makes recommendations with respect to patents 
affecting standards for the Smart Grid, a system critical to the national 
energy infrastructure. I do not claim that the same considerations apply in 
commercial contexts, such as mobile telephony, computing, or semiconductor 
standards. While these technologies are economically important, they do not 
implicate the same national health, safety, and security priorities as 
electrical power transmission. A different set of considerations is called for 
with respect to technologies that are primarily commercial in nature, and a 
full discussion of these considerations is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. 
Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology 
Landscape, AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (drawing similar conclusions in 
the related areas of renewal energy and other “green” technologies). 
17. Public electrical power is distinguished from power that is privately 
generated by diesel, wind, solar, or other local facilities operated by private 
parties, generally for their own benefit. 
18. See Effectively Transforming our Electric Delivery System to a Smart 
Grid: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t of the H. Comm. on 
Sci. and Tech., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 House Smart Grid 
Hearing]. For a general-interest history of the evolution of the U.S. electrical 
power grid, from Edison and Westinghouse to the present, see generally 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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Whether these facilities use coal, petrochemicals, nuclear 
fission, hydroelectric energy, solar energy, wind power, or other 
generating means, the electricity that they produce flows into 
the grid on an undifferentiated basis and is distributed across 
the country via a complex network of transmission stations and 
three hundred thousand miles of power lines.19 
The grid operates on a real-time basis. That is, electricity 
must be used at the moment it is generated and cannot, using 
today’s technology, be stored for future use.20 Thus, during hot 
summer days when tens of millions of air conditioning units 
are running simultaneously, power generation is at its peak, 
and during the cooler evenings and winter months it is lower.21 
The grid must always have the capacity to meet peak demand, 
though much of its generating capacity remains unutilized 
most of the time.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR 
ELECTRIFIED WORLD (2007). 
19. 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 4. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. 
22. Id. 
5
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Figure 1 
U.S. Electric Transmission Network23 
 
 
 
B. Intelligence in the Grid.  
 
The U.S. power distribution system is in many ways 
technologically advanced.24 Energy consumption is monitored 
in real time and generation capacity is adjusted to meet rising 
and falling demand on a minute-by-minute basis.25 Outages are 
isolated and repaired with remarkable swiftness, and back-up 
systems enable rapid recovery from damage and faults.26 
Nevertheless, there are some ways in which the national power 
grid remains a relic of the past. Many of these manifest 
themselves in the interface between the grid and the end 
 
23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-204, ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING: 2003 BLACKOUT IDENTIFIES CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 12 (2003). 
24. See, e.g., 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 35-36 
(statement of Paul De Martini, Vice President, Advanced Technology, 
Southern California Edison). 
25. Id. at 54. 
26. But see SCHEWE, supra note 18, at 6-9, 134-56 (describing the 
widespread New York blackouts of 1965 and 2003). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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consumer. For example, electricity meters in many homes date 
to the 1960s and are still read manually by technicians, homes, 
and businesses that generate their own electricity through 
solar panels, wind turbines, or other means have no way to 
share this power with others when they are not using it, and 
consumers have no way to notify the utility of their projected 
energy needs (such as lower consumption during vacations).27 
 
C. A “Smart” Grid? 
 
These shortcomings and others have led to calls for the 
development of a national “Smart Grid” that utilizes advanced 
communications and network properties to dramatically 
improve the efficiency of power generation and consumption in 
the United States.28 Such a Smart Grid, it is hoped, will ease 
grid congestion and increase transmission capacity, network 
reliability, and pricing transparency, as well as enable a host of 
consumer-producer interactive transactions.29 
The implementation of the Smart Grid will be a 
massive, multi-decade technological undertaking, and will 
require the engagement not only of electrical utilities and 
operators, but also a wide array of technology vendors in areas 
including power metering, computer networking, and 
telecommunications.30 The alternative is continuing reliance on 
a power transmission architecture that is obsolete, inefficient 
and unable to deliver the energy-efficient solutions that are 
desperately needed in today’s economy. Figure 2 illustrates the 
complex set of interrelated network elements that would 
comprise the Smart Grid architecture. 
 
27. See 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 54-55; GRID 
2030 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5. 
28. See generally GRID 2030 REPORT, supra note 1. 
29. Id. at iv-v. 
30. See 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 33-34 
(statement of Paul De Martini, Vice President, Advanced Technology, 
Southern California Edison). 
7
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Figure 2 
Smart Grid Conceptual Reference Diagram31 
 
 
 
III.  Electrical Power Regulation and the Smart Grid 
 
A. The U.S. Electrical Power Regulatory Landscape.  
 
Electrical power generation and transmission in the 
United States is regulated by a combination of federal and 
state authorities. The Federal Electrical Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), an independent federal agency, has 
authority under the Federal Power Act,32 among other things, 
to regulate interstate electricity transmission and to oversee 
the rates and tariffs for wholesale electricity sales in the U.S.33 
The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) oversees 
 
31. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7, at 35 (fig.3-2). 
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2006). 
33. To a large degree, the transmission and sale of wholesale electricity 
in the U.S. has been deregulated, and a market for independent power and 
market-based energy trading exists. See generally SCHEWE, supra note 18, at 
171-80 (discussing the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) 
and the 1992 Energy Policy Act). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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the siting, construction, operation, and decommissioning of 
nuclear power facilities and the disposal of radioactive waste.34 
At the state level, public utility commissions (PUCs) regulate 
retail electricity sales and the commissioning of electrical 
generation facilities.35 
 
B. EISA and the Smart Grid Mandate.  
 
In 2007, Congress enacted EISA to address numerous 
areas of domestic energy policy and regulation. Title XIII of 
EISA designates the modernization of the national electricity 
transmission and distribution system as a national priority, 
both for meeting future energy demand and maintaining a 
“reliable and secure energy infrastructure.”36 EISA identifies 
the following characteristics of a national “Smart Grid” 
necessary to achieve these results: 
(1) Increased use of digital information and 
controls technology to improve reliability, 
security, and efficiency of the electric grid. 
(2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and 
resources, with full cyber-security. 
(3) Deployment and integration of distributed 
resources and generation, including renewable 
resources. 
(4) Development and incorporation of demand 
response, demand-side resources, and energy-
efficiency resources. 
(5) Deployment of ‘‘smart’’ technologies (real-
time, automated, interactive technologies that 
optimize the physical operation of appliances and 
consumer devices) for metering, communications 
concerning grid operations and status, and 
distribution automation. 
 
34. About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). 
35. See NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7, at 33. 
36. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
§ 1301, 121 Stat. 1492, 1783-84. 
9
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(6) Integration of ‘‘smart’’ appliances and 
consumer devices. 
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced 
electricity storage and peak-shaving 
technologies, including plug-in electric and 
hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-storage air 
conditioning. 
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information 
and control options. 
(9) Development of standards for communication 
and interoperability of appliances and equipment 
connected to the electric grid, including the 
infrastructure serving the grid. 
(10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable 
or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid 
technologies, practices, and services.37 
 
EISA also calls for public utilities to make Smart Grid pricing, 
usage and source information available to consumers via the 
Internet or other electronic means.38 
 
IV.  Standards and the Smart Grid 
 
One of the impediments to the implementation of a national 
Smart Grid system is the lack of uniform standards and 
protocols through which the many components of the grid 
system can communicate and interact. Most power and 
transmissions systems today can communicate only with 
equipment offered by the same vendor, but the Smart Grid will 
depend on real-time interaction among components supplied by 
a myriad of vendors.39 
 
A. FERC and the EISA Interoperability Requirements.  
 
In Clause 9 of the EISA Smart Grid mandate, Congress 
identifies communication and interoperability standards as key 
 
37. Id. (emphasis added). 
38. § 1307(a)(17), 121 Stat. at 1792. 
39. 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 6. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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components of the national Smart Grid.40 In enacting this 
mandate, Congress recognized that technologies offered by a 
wide range of vendors would need to interoperate seamlessly in 
order to realize the promise of the Smart Grid.41 Thus, just as 
computers, printers, headsets, and countless other peripheral 
devices sold by different manufacturers communicate with one 
another using common industry standards such as USB, WiFi, 
and Bluetooth, the diverse components of the Smart Grid 
network require uniform standards for communication and 
interoperability. Accordingly, EISA calls for a Smart Grid 
interoperability framework that is “flexible, uniform and 
technology-neutral”42 and directs FERC to adopt standards and 
protocols “as may be necessary to insure smart-grid 
functionality and interoperability in interstate transmission of 
electric power . . . .”43 
 
B. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  
 
While EISA grants FERC the authority to adopt standards 
and protocols for the implementation of the Smart Grid, the 
responsibility for developing the Smart Grid interoperability 
framework falls to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).44 NIST is authorized under EISA “to 
coordinate development of a framework that includes protocols 
and model standards for information management to achieve 
 
40. § 1301(9), 121 Stat. at 1784. 
41. 2009 House Smart Grid Hearing, supra note 18, at 3-8. 
42. § 1305(b), 121 Stat. at 1788. 
43. § 1305(d), 121 Stat. at 1788. 
44. Founded in 1901, NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency within the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Technology Administration whose mission is 
to develop and promote measurement, standards, and technology to enhance 
productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of life. Under the 
National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), NIST is 
also charged to “coordinate Federal, State, and local technical standards 
activities and conformity assessment activities with private sector technical 
standards activities and conformity assessment activities with the goal of 
eliminating unnecessary duplication and complexity in the development and 
promulgation of conformity assessment requirements and measures.” 
National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 
110 Stat. 775. 
11
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interoperability of smart grid devices and systems.”45 In 
developing this framework, NIST is directed to solicit input 
and cooperation from various federal agencies and private 
entities, including electricity industry trade associations.46 
NIST released the initial version of a comprehensive 
framework and roadmap for Smart Grid interoperability 
standards in January 2010.47 Release 2.0 of this framework 
document was published in February 2012 after an open public 
comment period.48 
 
C. The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP). 
 
In order to carry out its responsibilities under EISA, in 
2009 NIST formed the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel 
(SGIP), as an independent, consensus-based organization 
comprising representatives of interested stakeholders (utilities, 
vendors, service providers, and the public).49 As of the writing 
of this Article, the SGIP comprised 740 member organizations 
represented by more than two thousand individuals.50 Each 
 
45. § 1305(a), 121 Stat. at 1787. The Smart Grid standards mandated by 
EISA relate to the interoperability of different components of the Smart Grid. 
Other types of standards, such as those relating to the safety of electrical 
equipment, power line emissions, nuclear safety, and the like are addressed 
elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
46. § 1305(a)(2), 121 Stat. at 1788. 
47. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7. 
48. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
DRAFT NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY 
STANDARDS, RELEASE 2.0 (2011) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 2.0], 
available at http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/IKBFramework/Draft_NIST_Framework_Release_2-
0_10-17-2011.pdf. 
49. SGIP has recently announced plans to transform into a self-
sustaining independent entity that is legally separate from NIST. See Dr. 
George Arnold, National Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability, Nat’l 
Inst. of Standards and Tech., Power Point Presentation at SGIP Governing 
Board January 2012 Meeting 10 (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/SGIPGBMeetingsAndMinutes. 
50. NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Wiki Smart Grid Interoperability 
Panel Site, What is the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel?, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS AND TECH., http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/WebHome#What_is_the_Smart_Grid_Interoper 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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technical area within SGIP is addressed by a Priority Action 
Plan (PAP), of which there are currently nineteen.51 
Though SGIP evaluates and recommends standards, it 
does not currently develop standards itself (though it is not 
precluded from doing so). That work has been left to a host of 
external standards development organizations (SDOs) ranging 
from large formal organizations that work in multiple technical 
areas to small consortia that focus on one or two specialized 
applications. Among the many organizations that have 
developed standards under consideration by SGIP are the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), OASIS, the 
WIMAX Forum, and ZigBee Alliance. Each of these 
organizations develops standards according to its own internal 
procedures independently of SGIP and NIST. However, if such 
an organization has developed (or is developing) a standard 
that SGIP deems to be of potential interest for Smart Grid, it 
may initiate consideration of the standard for inclusion in the 
SGIP “Catalog of Standards” and recommendation to FERC. 
In July 2011 NIST added the first six standards to the 
SGIP Catalog of Standards covering technologies such as 
Internet protocols, energy usage information, electric vehicle 
plugs, and upgrading household electric meters to smart 
meters.52 Release 2.0 of NIST’s Smart Grid interoperability 
framework adds twenty-two additional standards to the 
framework.53 Additionally, NIST and the Smart Grid Co-
Ordination Group of the European Union jointly published a 
white paper expressing their intent to collaborate to ensure a 
consistent set of Smart Grid standards.54 Among the many 
 
51. Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS 
AND TECH. (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/priority-
actions.cfm. 
52. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Smart Grid Panel 
Approves Six Standards for Catalog (July 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/sgip-072611.cfm. 
53. NIST FRAMEWORK RELEASE 2.0, supra note 48. 
54. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. & SMART GRID CO-ORD. GRP., 
WHITE PAPER ON STANDARDIZATION OF SMART GRIDS (n.d.), available at 
13
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challenges that will face implementers of Smart Grid products 
will be understanding and complying with the many different 
SDO rules and policies associated with this wide assortment of 
standards. 
 
D. The Smart Grid Standards Ecosystem.  
 
The various agencies and organizations involved in 
developing interoperability standards for the Smart Grid 
engage in a complex set of interactions. Figure 3 illustrates the 
interrelationship among these actors with respect to Smart 
Grid standards development and adoption. 
Figure 3 
 
 
V.  Standards and Patents 
 
Technical standards specify methods by which complex 
technologies interact and interoperate. As such, the 
technologies specified by standards are often suitable subject 
 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/eu-us-smartgrids-white-paper.pdf. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss3/2
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matter for patent protection.55 Because standards are likely to 
be adopted by large segments of a given market, obtaining 
patent protection on standardized technologies can appear to 
be an attractive proposition for companies involved in the 
standards-development process. The more complicated the 
technology that a standard specifies, the more likely the 
standard will be covered by patents owned by members of the 
SDO or by third parties. Two general patent-related issues 
arise in the context of technology standardization; these are 
referred to as patent stacking and patent hold-up. 
 
A. Patent Stacking and Patent Pools.  
 
If many different organizations hold patents that are all 
required to implement a standard, then a manufacturer must 
obtain a license from each of these different patent-holding 
organizations in order to implement the standard. Not only can 
this multiplicity of patent holders increase the cost of 
manufacturing and selling a standardized product (sometimes 
to a level that is excessive in relation to the overall value of the 
product), it can also prevent manufacturing or sale entirely if 
any one patent holder elects not to license its patents (usually 
referred to as “standards-essential” patents) to a manufacturer. 
This situation is referred to as patent “stacking” or a patent 
“thicket”.56 If a patent thicket exists and licenses to all of the 
patents in the thicket are not available on economical terms, 
the standardized technology may be rendered uncompetitive in 
comparison to products that do not conform to the standard. 
 
55. Standards themselves, as written documents, are subject to 
copyright protection, and the SDOs that develop standards often hold 
trademarks in their names and certain standards (e.g., WiFi and Bluetooth). 
Copyright and trademark issues are generally beyond the scope of this 
Article. For a general discussion, see Contreras, supra note 9. 
56. The economic and legal literature exploring this phenomenon, both 
within and outside the context of technical standards, is extensive and 
varied. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, 
Patent Pools and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004); Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); 
Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to 
Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008). 
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More seriously, if any of the holders of such patents elect not to 
license their patents to those wishing to implement a 
standardized technology, then the technology may not become 
widely implementable and substantially diminished in value. 
One technique that has evolved to address patent stacking 
is the creation of patent “pools”. In a patent pool, multiple 
patent owners contribute or license their standards-essential 
patents to a common agent (sometimes one of the patent 
holders and sometimes a newly-formed entity). This licensing 
agent then offers licenses to the entire pool at a single royalty 
rate, and net revenues are allocated among the pool 
participants in accordance with a pre-determined formula. 
Such pools have been used effectively in connection with 
consumer electronics standards such as the MPEG audio 
compression format,57 the DVD video compression format58 and 
third generation wireless communications standards.59 In each 
of these cases the U.S. Department of Justice approved the 
proposed pool, pointing to certain features that reduced 
potentially anticompetitive effects.60 For example, each such 
pool contained only patents that were “essential” to the 
implementation of the standard; licensees were always free to 
obtain patent licenses directly from the patent holders, rather 
than from the pool; licensing of the pooled patents was 
conducted on a non-discriminatory basis; and any licenses that 
the patent holders required from their licensees only covered 
 
57. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of 
Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.htm. 
58. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of 
Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm; Letter 
from Joel I. Klein, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, to Carey 
R. Ramos, Esq., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm. 
59. Letter from Charles A. James, Asst. Att’y Gen, Antitrust Div., Dep’t 
of Justice, to Ky P. Ewing, Esq., Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. (Nov. 12, 2002), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.htm. 
60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITION 74-85 (2007) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC Report], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandComp
etitionrpt0704.pdf. 
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patents that were, themselves, essential to implementation of 
the standard.61 
Of course, the value of a patent pool may be limited if 
certain holders of standards-essential patents elect not to join. 
Such a situation arose in the case of the Federal 
Communication Commission’s (FCC) ATSC standard for digital 
television transmission. Though many holders of patents 
essential to implementation of the mandatory ATSC standard 
did elect to form a patent pool, one patent holder, Funai 
Electric Company, did not join. Instead Funai sought to charge 
royalties for its single patent at a rate equal to that charged by 
the entire ATSC pool (approximately 5 percent of the television 
price).62 When Funai sought to bar imports of televisions by 
Vizio, Inc., a manufacturer that refused to pay this royalty, 
Vizio sought temporary relief from the FCC. Though the matter 
was rendered moot because Vizio was found not to infringe the 
asserted patent,63 the dispute highlights the risks that can 
arise when patent pooling arrangements do not include all 
relevant patent holders. 
 
B. Patent Ambushes and Policy Measures.  
 
The second major issue that can arise in the standards 
context is patent “ambush,” which occurs when a patent holder 
seeks to assert a previously unidentified patent against 
implementers of a standard after the standard has been 
approved.64 If a patent ambush occurs after the industry has 
 
61. Id. at 68-84. 
62. Resp’ts Req. Temporary Relief, Vizio, Inc. v. Funai Electric Co., 24 
F.C.C.R. 2880 (Feb. 20, 2009). 
63. Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
64. See Elhauge, supra note 56, at 536; M. Sean Royall, Amanda Tessar 
& Aaron Di Vincenzo, Deterring “Patent Ambush” in Standard Setting: 
Lessons Learned from Rambus and Qualcomm, 23 ANTITRUST 34 (2009); see 
generally Lemley, supra note 12. Some commentators include patent ambush 
within a broader scope of opportunistic patent holder behavior that has been 
termed patent “hold-up”. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 12; Lemley, supra 
note 12. This description, however, has been criticized as an inaccurate use of 
the term as it is generally understood in the economics literature. See 
Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Keiff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP and 
SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination 8 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2012). For purposes of this article, I will use the 
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devoted significant resources to production, marketing, and 
training with respect to standardized products (in economic 
terms, after the standard has become “locked-in”), unexpected 
royalty demands can severely disrupt the market, driving up 
the cost of standardized products to levels that are inefficient 
and uncompetitive with alternative technologies.65 
Patent ambushes can occur either with patents held by 
participants in the SDO or by non-participating third parties. 
The risk posed by SDO participants’ patents is perceived as 
particularly serious because, unlike non-participating third 
parties, SDO participants can potentially shape the technical 
parameters of a standard toward their own patent positions.66 
In response, many SDOs have adopted policies that attempt to 
address ambush by requiring that its participants must: (1) 
disclose all standards-essential patents prior to the standard’s 
approval, and/or (2) license all standards-essential patents to 
implementers of the standard, either on a royalty-free basis or 
on terms that are “reasonable and nondiscriminatory.”67 
Obligations to disclose standards-essential patents ensure that 
standards developers receive adequate information to assess 
the relative patent-related costs and risks of technologies under 
consideration for standardization and to “design around” 
potentially blocking patents, and licensing obligations ensure 
that such patents will be licensed on terms that are, at least 
roughly, understood.68 
 
 
 
term “patent ambush” to refer to the described conduct by a patent holder. 
65. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 154-55; Farrell et al., supra note 12, at 
608 (“[S]tandards hold-up is … a public policy concern because downstream 
consumers are harmed when excessive royalties are passed on to them.”). 
66. There is also far less that can be done about the assertion of patents 
by non-participants, as they have no formal relationship with the relevant 
SDO. 
67. See DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 60, at 42-48; SECTION OF SCI. & 
TECH. LAW, COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL, xiii-xiv (Jorge L Contreras 
ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards Manual]; Nicos L. Tsilas, Toward 
Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure Policies in a Post-
Rambus World, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH 475, 478-81 (2004); Farrell et al., supra 
note 12, at 624-44. 
68. ABA Standards Manual, supra note 67, at xiv. 
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1. Disclosure Requirements and Their Violation.  
 
Despite the adoption by many SDOs of such patent 
disclosure policies, there have been several prominent 
instances in which SDO participants have failed to make the 
required disclosures and then, after lock-in of the standard, 
have sought to enforce their patents or collect royalties from 
implementers. The first of these cases to attract significant 
attention involved Dell Computer, which failed to disclose 
patents relevant to the VL-bus standard developed in the Video 
Electronics Standards Association (VESA).69 Following 
approval of the standard, Dell sought to enforce its patents 
against other computer manufacturers. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) brought an action against Dell for engaging 
in unfair business practices under Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. The FTC reasoned that 
where there is evidence that the association 
[VESA] would have implemented a different non-
proprietary design had it been informed of the 
patent conflict during the certification process, 
and where Dell failed to act in good faith to 
identify and disclose patent conflicts - 
enforcement action is appropriate to prevent 
harm to competition and consumers.70 
 
The FTC action resulted in the entry of a 1996 consent order 
permanently restricting Dell from enforcing those patents 
against any third party.71 
Perhaps the most-cited episode of an SDO participant’s 
failure to disclose patents involved the semiconductor 
technology developer Rambus, Inc. Hundreds of articles have 
been written about the decade-long legal battles in which 
Rambus sought to assert various patents covering dynamic 
random access memory (DRAM) against virtually every other 
DRAM manufacturer after those technologies had been 
standardized by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council 
 
69. Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
70. Id. at 624. 
71. Id. 
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(JEDEC), a voluntary SDO in which Rambus participated in 
the early 1990s.72 Ultimately, Rambus was exonerated with 
respect to allegations that it violated JEDEC’s patent 
disclosure rules, primarily due to the vagueness of the rules 
themselves.73 Yet, due to its strategic patenting of technologies 
under consideration at JEDEC, Rambus has the potential to 
extract more than a billion dollars in royalty income from the 
semiconductor industry over the life of its patents.74 
SDO disclosure rules are not only relevant to the 
information technology industries. In the late 1980s, the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) began to develop 
standards for the composition of low-emissions gasoline. Union 
Oil Company of California (Unocal), together with several other 
gasoline refiners and automobile producers, actively 
participated in the agency’s standard-setting processes. In 
1996, shortly before new CARB regulations based on these 
standards went into effect, Unocal announced that it held 
patents essential to implementing the new emissions 
requirements, and that it intended to charge royalties on all 
gasoline sold in California.75 After an unsuccessful attempt by 
competitors to invalidate the asserted patent, in 2003 the FTC 
brought an action against Unocal, charging it with attempted 
 
72. See, e.g., ABA Standards Manual, supra note 67, at vii-viii; Mark A. 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1929-30 (2002); Tsilas, supra note 67, at 481-83; Joel M. 
Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, 
Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 661 
(2009); Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent Holdup in Standards 
Development: Life After Rambus v. FTC, 23 ANTITRUST 26 (2009). 
73. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003) (in which the court, while questioning 
Rambus’s business ethics, nevertheless concluded that it did not violate the 
vague JEDEC disclosure policy). 
74. Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Complaint 
Against Rambus, Inc.: Deception of Standard-Setting Organization Violated 
Federal Law (June 19, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/rambus.shtm (“Rambus could, over the life of 
its patents, extract royalty payments well in excess of a billion dollars from 
the memory industry.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305, 2003 WL 22977696 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 
2003) (initial dec.); see also Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the 
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 626-27 (2002). 
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monopolization and unreasonable restraints on trade.76 The 
matter was ultimately settled when Unocal agreed to cease 
enforcement of its standards-essential patents.77 
 
2. The Many Meanings of F/RAND.  
Many SDOs require that participants commit to license 
standards-essential patents on terms that are “reasonable and 
non-discriminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (FRAND). This requirement is built into 
ANSI’s “Essential Requirements” for all ANSI-accredited 
SDOs78 and is equally pervasive in Europe and other 
jurisdictions. Despite the intuitive appeal of these 
requirements, however, a consistent and practical definition of 
F/RAND has been notoriously difficult to pin down. Rysman 
and Simcoe have argued that F/RAND commitments are 
inherently imprecise, and that patent holders may, in fact, 
“offer [F]RAND pricing commitments with the belief that this 
commitment is so vague and ill-defined that it is in fact 
vacuous.”79 Recently, F/RAND-related litigation has embroiled 
large segments of the telecommunications and computing 
industries, both consuming otherwise productive resources and 
inserting significant uncertainty into major product markets.80 
F/RAND commitments are difficult to quantify because 
there is no objective standard by which “reasonableness” (or 
“nondiscrimination,” for that matter) is measured.81 In order to 
 
76. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2003 WL 22977696. 
77. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305, 2005 WL 2003365 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 
2005) (dec. and order). 
78. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
ANSI PATENT POLICY § II (rev. ed. 2011), available at 
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/Americ
an%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/Gui
delines%20for%20Implementation%20of%20ANSI%20Patent%20Policy%202
011.pdf. 
79. Marc Rysman & Tim Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND 
Pricing Commitments 2 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/published/NAAST.pdf. 
80. See Jorge L. Contreras, The FRAND Wars: Who’s on First?, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/the-frand-wars-whos-on-first.html. 
81. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in 
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determine whether a licensing offer by a patent holder complies 
with F/RAND requirements, the specific facts of the situation 
must be evaluated. These facts include not only relevant 
royalty rates in the market, but also customary practices 
relating to non-royalty terms such as reciprocity, grantback 
licenses, defensive suspension, confidentiality, and the like.82 
Also, given that a patent holder’s F/RAND licensing terms are 
often not revealed until negotiations that occur after a standard 
has been adopted (i.e., “locked-in”), parties involved in 
standards setting can experience uncertainty regarding the 
ultimate cost of adopting a standard encumbered by patents, 
even if a F/RAND commitment exists.83 Put another way, the 
uncertainty of F/RAND licensing terms may simply result in a 
new form of hold-up that replaces, but does not alleviate, the 
risk of hold-up by unknown patents.84 
 
3. Ex Ante Disclosure of Licensing Terms.  
 
Several commentators have suggested that permitting or 
requiring patent holders to disclose their royalty rates and 
licensing terms to SDO participants prior to the adoption of a 
standard (i.e., ex ante) would alleviate the F/RAND hold-up 
problems described above.85 Such advance disclosure, it is 
argued, would enable SDO participants to evaluate the cost of 
including particular patented technologies in a standard prior 
 
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments,74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2007). 
82. ABA Standards Manual, supra note 67, at 56-67. 
83. Wallace, supra note 72, at 665. 
84. Id.; Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, The Value of Patents in Industry 
Standards: Avoiding License Arbitrage with Voluntary Rules, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 
1, 3-4 (2008). But see Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and 
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 
351, 357 (2007) (arguing that RAND obligations are not “materially 
underspecified”). 
85. Lemley, supra note 12, at 158-59; Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and 
Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to Adoption of Industry Standards: 
Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 644, 648-
50 (2003); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for 
Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 727, 741-42 (2005); Wallace, supra note 72, at 689-92. 
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to adoption, and would thus enable more efficient decision 
making while the standard is being developed. 
Critics of this approach have argued that such ex ante 
disclosures present both practical and legal issues. They 
contend that the disclosure of licensing terms during the 
standards development process could cause the process to 
become more cumbersome, lengthy and expensive.86 However, 
there is little empirical evidence to support these claims, and a 
recent NIST-funded study conducted by the Author failed to 
find evidence that ex ante disclosure policies had any negative 
effect on the groups studied.87 
It has also been suggested that ex ante licensing 
disclosures could facilitate the improper exchange of 
information among competitors and might place too much 
power in the hands of licensees acting collectively. That is, 
potential implementers of a standard, in negotiating ex ante 
license terms with a patent holder, could collectively exert 
anticompetitive pressure, causing royalties to decrease below 
their fair (or optimal) level.88 Following this argument to its 
logical conclusion, group pressure could drive all royalty rates 
toward zero, resulting in the devaluation of patents covering a 
standard. In the NIST-funded study mentioned above, there 
was no evidence that such depression of royalty rates occurred 
in practice.89 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has also approved 
SDO ex ante disclosure policies in two recent Business Review 
Letters. In 2006, the DOJ indicated that it would not take 
enforcement action against the VMEbus International Trade 
Association (VITA), which required participants to disclose 
 
86. DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 60, at 50; see Skitol, supra note 85, at 
734. 
87. Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante 
Licensing Disclosure Policies on the Development of Voluntary Technical 
Standards 1 (Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. 2011) [hereinafter Effects of Ex 
Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916743. 
88. See DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 60, at 52-53; Skitol, supra note 85, 
at 735. 
89. Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies, supra note 87, at 46-
48. 
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their “most restrictive” licensing terms on an ex ante basis.90 In 
approving the VITA policy, the DOJ reasoned that ex ante 
disclosures of licensing terms is more likely to promote than 
hinder competition among patent holders.91 Likewise, in its 
2007 IEEE Business Review Letter, the DOJ approved a policy 
in which patent holders were given the option to disclose 
licensing terms, including royalty rates, prior to the adoption of 
a standard.92 The DOJ considered the IEEE policy “a sensible 
effort to preserve competition between technological 
alternatives before the standard is set in order to alleviate 
concern that commitments by patent holders to license on 
RAND terms are not sufficient to avoid disputes . . ..”93 In a 
similar vein, the European Commission’s guidelines, relating to 
horizontal competition, express a general level of comfort with 
ex ante licensing disclosures.94 
 
VI. Intellectual Property Challenges and Opportunities for 
Smart Grid Standards 
 
A. Patents and the Smart Grid.  
 
Like any area characterized by rapid technological 
innovation and growth, numerous components of the Smart 
Grid are likely to be covered by patents. One study found that 
in 2009 ninety-one new U.S. patents were issued covering 
technologies relating to utility metering and the smart grid.95 
 
90. Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
Dep’t of Justice, to Robert A. Skitol, Esq., Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP (Oct. 
30, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.htm. 
91. Id. 
92. Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
Dep’t of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Apr. 
30, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.htm. 
93. Id. at pt. IV. 
94. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 
2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, ¶ 299. 
95. JOHN M. LAZARUS, CLEANTECH ENERGY PATENT LANDSCAPE ANNUAL 
REPORT 2010: INVESTMENT AND LICENSING OPPORTUNITIES MAY ARISE IN NEW 
AREAS 20 (2010) (on file with author). 
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Another study identified 318 smart grid patents held as of 
October 2009 by eight key industry participants including 
Siemens, ABB, General Electric, Hitachi, and Samsung.96 
Southern California Edison (SCE) attracted significant 
attention in 2008 when it was revealed that it had applied for 
broad patent protection on a “Method of Communicating 
between a Utility and its Customer Locations.”97 The breadth of 
SCE’s pending patent claims, which address a wide range of 
two-way communications between a utility and its customers 
using an “advanced utility meter,” alarmed many in the 
industry.98 While SCE has committed to license this patent on 
a royalty-free basis and not to seek patent protection on 
additional Smart Grid technologies,99 the potential for broad 
claims covering other aspects of emerging smart grid 
technologies continues to cause concern.100 
Of even greater concern than the SCE patent are patents 
held by so-called non-practicing entities (NPEs) or patent-
assertion entities (PAEs), entities whose primary business is 
seeking monetary returns from patent licensing and 
 
96. Global Smart Grids Patent Portfolios Analysis, TECHIPM LLC BLOG 
(Oct. 21, 2009), http://techipm-
innovationfrontline.blogspot.com/2009/10/global-smart-grids-patent-
portfolios.html. 
97. U.S. Patent No. 626,810 (filed Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter SCE Smart 
Grid Patent]. 
98. See, e.g., Phillip Bane, Utility Attempts to Patent Advanced Metering, 
SMARTGRIDNEWS (Sept. 11, 2008), 
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/industry/Utility_Attempts_to
_Patent_Advanced_Metering.html. 
99. Edison Smart Connect Open Innovation & IP, S. CAL. EDISON (Sept. 
2008), 
http://osgug.ucaiug.org/sgsystems/Shared%20Documents/SCE%20AMI%20Us
e%20Case%20Patent%20Overview%20%20080919.pdf.; Non-Exclusive 
Royalty Free License for SCE’s Use Cases, SMART GRID INFORMATION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, (last visited March 4, 2012), 
http://www.sgiclearinghouse.org/UseCases?q=node/2028&lb=1. 
100. It should be noted that the susceptibility of different industries to 
capture by patents varies significantly. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) 
(describing substantial differences between patenting behavior in industries 
such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and software); Cahoy, supra note 
16, at 26 (observing the possibility for differing patent behaviors even within 
fields such as renewable energy). 
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enforcement.101 In its comprehensive 2011 report The Evolving 
Marketplace, the Federal Trade Commission observes that such 
entities “can deter innovation by raising costs and risks 
without making a technological contribution.”102 In the Smart 
Grid area, two related NPEs, SIPCo and Intus, have brought 
numerous patent infringement suits against Florida Power & 
Light, Reliant Energy, and other power distribution companies, 
regarding wireless communications technology used in the 
energy industry.103 To date, most of these suits have resulted in 
settlements of a confidential nature,104 but the threat of further 
enforcement activities by such entities remains. 
 
B. Patents on Smart Grid Standards. 
 
As noted in Section V, Smart Grid standards are being 
developed by a broad range of standards development 
organizations and consortia. Each of these groups has its own 
intellectual property policies and procedures that have been 
developed independently and, for the most part, without 
reference to the Smart Grid. In some cases, disclosure of 
standards-essential patents may be required, in others not. In 
some cases licensing of standards-essential patents may be 
required on a royalty-free basis, or on F/RAND terms, or not at 
all. This diversity of approaches is not surprising, given that 
the groups involved in Smart Grid standards development 
come from a variety of different industries and have differing 
membership structures, commercial goals, and histories. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a consistent approach toward 
intellectual property among the groups developing Smart Grid 
standards, and the resulting potential that patent hold-up and 
stacking may have on the Smart Grid infrastructure, have 
caused concern among potential implementers and regulators. 
 
101. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING 
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011). 
102. Id. at 9. 
103. See ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, 
GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN INNOVATION 142, 143 (2011). 
104. Id. at 142-45. 
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Intellectual property concerns were raised in July 2010 
during Congressional hearings relating to the Smart Grid105 
and again at a January 2011 technical conference convened by 
FERC.106 At this technical conference, Paul Di Martini, a 
former Southern California Edison executive and the current 
Smart Grid Chief Technology Officer of Cisco Systems,107 
expressed significant concern regarding the “transparency and 
predictability of licensing terms for patents that are necessary 
to implement [Smart Grid] standards” and urged SGIP 
participants to consider patent licensing information when 
evaluating which standards to recommend for industry 
adoption.108 
The 2009 NIST Framework document establishes as a 
“guiding principle” that Smart Grid standards be “openly 
available under fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
terms.”109 But as discussed in Section V.C.3 above, compliance 
with such vague F/RAND requirements is notoriously difficult 
 
105. Smart Grid Architecture and Standards: Assessing Coordination 
and Progress: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech. & Innovation of the H. 
Comm. on Sci. & Tech, 111th Cong. 111-104 (2010) (statement of Dr. George 
Arnold, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.). In response to questions by Rep. 
Biggert (R - Ill.) regarding potential intellectual property issues with Smart 
Grid standards, Dr. George Arnold cited the F/RAND requirement as 
addressing the issues. Id. 
106. U.S. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DOCKET NO. RM11-2-000, 
TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS (2011) 
[hereinafter FERC TECHNICAL CONFERENCE]. On October 10, 2010, NIST 
submitted five “foundational families of standards” to FERC for consideration 
in its rulemaking. 
107. Mr. Di Martini is also the first named inventor on the SCE Smart 
Grid patent application. See SCE Smart Grid Patent, supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
108.  FERC TECHNICAL CONFERENCE, supra note 106 (statement of Paul 
Di Martini), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20110131084624-
De%20Martini,%20Cisco.pdf. In July 2011, after considering public input, 
FERC formally declined to institute a rulemaking proceeding with respect to 
the five NIST-recommended standards families, determining that there was 
“insufficient consensus” for adoption. Order on Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards, 136 FERC ¶61,039 (July 19, 2011). In making its ruling, the 
Commission cited concerns regarding both cybersecurity and “potential 
unintended consequences from premature adoption of individual standards.” 
Id. 
109. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7, at 48. 
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to assess.110 Compounding the inherent uncertainty of this 
F/RAND regime is the fact that, in this case, F/RAND 
availability of patent licenses is not required, but is merely one 
of several non-exclusive guiding principles that may be 
followed.111 At the December 2010 plenary meeting of SGIP, 
however, Dr. George Arnold, the NIST National Coordinator 
for Smart Grid Interoperability, called for greater scrutiny of 
patents that may cover Smart Grid standards.112 In particular, 
he noted that Smart Grid standards “must be . . . 
implementable at reasonable and affordable cost to rate-
payers/consumers”.113 To achieve this goal, he outlined several 
potential approaches, including early disclosure of known 
patents, patent pools and ex ante disclosure of license terms.114 
Despite this guidance, NIST and SGIP have taken few 
concrete steps toward implementing mechanisms to avoid 
patent hold-up and stacking that may affect Smart Grid 
standards. In late 2010, SGIP formed an Intellectual Property 
Rights Working Group to develop and maintain an SGIP 
intellectual property policy and serve as a forum for 
intellectual property discussions within SGIP.115 One of the 
initial projects of this group was to form a task force to suggest 
types of patent-related information that could be collected with 
reference to standards being considered for inclusion in the 
SGIP Catalog of Standards.116 After a year of deliberation, this 
task force, which primarily consisted of representatives of 
information technology and telecommunications vendors and 
 
110. See Rysman & Simcoe, supra note 79. 
111. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7, at 45-46. 
112. GEORGE W. ARNOLD, NAT’L INST.OF STANDARDS AND TECH., PATENTS 
AND STANDARDS” IN THE CONTEXT OF SMART GRID 5 (2010), available at 
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SGIPGWorkingGroupIPRWG/IPRWG_12-10-
2010_003_NISToverviewfromCWGeorge-Arnold-.pdf. 
113. Id. at 3. 
114. Id. at 5. 
115. See SGIP Intellectual Property Rights Working Group, Working 
Group Charter, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SGIPGWorkingGroupIPRWG/SGIPIPRWG_Charter_D
RAFTREV1.0.doc (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). 
116. The Author served as chair of this task force at the request of the 
IPR Working Group chair. 
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their advisors, reached consensus on collecting only six items of 
patent-related information about proposed SGIP standards 
consisting primarily of hyperlinks to publicly-accessible SDO 
intellectual policies and patent disclosures.117 Information 
about patent transfers, disputes, licensing terms, and other 
facets of the standards development process were deemed 
unsuitable for collection by SGIP and rejected by the majority 
of task force members.118 Thus, it is unlikely that any 
assurance that patent licenses will be available on the terms 
outlined by Dr. Arnold will be forthcoming from SGIP. 
 
C. An Opportunity for Action.  
 
As noted above, patents that cover technical standards 
have the potential to cause significant disruption of markets.119 
Left alone, patent holders interested in the Smart Grid could 
engage in the types of opportunistic behavior cited in the Dell, 
Rambus, and Unocal cases, thus endangering the deployment 
and operation of technology critical to the national energy 
infrastructure. The Smart Grid standardization effort is still in 
its early stages, and it is too early to tell whether such 
scenarios are likely or not.120 But even at this early stage, 
 
117. See SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, SGIP CATALOG OF 
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS STATEMENT (DPS): SSO XXXXX (2012), 
available at http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SGIPCatalogOfStandards/SGIP_CoS_DevelopmentPro
cessStatement.doc; SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, CATALOG OF 
STANDARDS INFORMATION (SIF) TEMPLATE (2011), available at 
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SGIPCatalogOfStandards/SGIPCatalogOfStandards_S
tandardsInformationForm.xls. 
118. See SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL, IPR ATTRIBUTES FOR 
COLLECTION BY SGIP (2012), available at http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-
sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SGIPGWorkingGroupIPRWG/Non-
Consensus_Matrix_w_Rationale_for_Inclusion_OBY_submission_02_17_12.d
ocx (explained as follows on the SGIP web site: “The IPR WG Task Force #1 
discussed some proposed IP attributes for collection by SGIP, which, for lack 
of consensus, were not provided to SGIP for inclusion in the SIF or DPS 
information sought from SDOs. These "non-consensus" items are listed here 
with their proponents' rationales for inclusion”). 
119. See Lemley, supra note 12, at 154-55. 
120. See DIETER ERNST, AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY STANDARDS SYSTEM – A 
“BEST PRACTICE” MODEL FOR INNOVATION POLICY? 56 (2012), available at 
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opportunities exist for government to address patent-based 
risks to Smart Grid standards before a crisis occurs. Some of 
these opportunities may be implemented at the agency and 
regulatory level, while others would require legislative or 
judicial action. A brief outline of potential governmental 
measures that can be taken in this regard follows. 
 
1. NIST/SGIP Selection Preferences.  
 
SGIP is chartered with the task of selecting the hundreds 
of standards and protocols that will be necessary to implement 
the national Smart Grid.121 NIST is then responsible for 
recommending these standards to FERC and state PUCs. 
When making selections among competing standards and 
technologies, SGIP and NIST should expressly consider 
intellectual property issues and give a preference to standards 
and technologies that are unencumbered by patents or 
available with minimal economic and other burdens. For 
example: 
a. SGIP should undertake an independent 
investigation to determine whether standards 
under consideration are covered by patents. 
b. If so, standards should be favored if essential 
patents are committed to be licensed on a royalty-
free basis. 
c. If royalty-free licensing is not available, then 
patent holders should at least disclose their 
maximum royalty rates and other licensing terms 
prior to consideration of the standard by SGIP. 
d. SGIP should also attempt to determine, based on 
independent investigation, whether standards 
under consideration are subject to disputes 
 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/econwp128.pdf (“It is 
still too early to judge whether the Smart grid model . . . provides a robust 
framework for solving the daunting tasks of the Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards project. Speed and efficiency it might well improve, but what 
about providing a reasonably fair distribution of the costs and the rents to be 
reaped from Smart Grid standardization?”). 
121. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 7, at 7. 
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involving patents, aggressive patent licensing 
campaigns, or other potentially disruptive factors. 
 
2. SGIP/NIST Patent Policies.  
 
In the event that SGIP or NIST initiates Smart Grid 
standards development activities of its own, it should ensure 
that patents held by participants in the standards development 
process are licensed either on a royalty-free basis, or that 
maximum royalty rates and other licensing terms are disclosed 
prior to any vote to approve the standard. Such disclosures 
would give potential standards adopters and implementers 
necessary information regarding the cost of implementing 
Smart Grid standards and the likely economic impact to 
utilities and, ultimately, consumers. Such information, which 
would likely be beneficial in a wide variety of standards-
dependent industries, is particularly salient in the realm of 
electricity generation and distribution, where rates are 
carefully regulated by state PUCs and FERC.122 
 
3. Federal March-In Rights.  
 
If SGIP or NIST convene or participate in the development 
of Smart Grid standards, the presence of federal funding may 
trigger federal “march-in” rights under the Bayh-Dole Act of 
1980.123 Such rights would enable the federal government to 
direct that patents to which the Act applies be licensed to third 
parties (i.e., implementers of the standard) on “terms that are 
reasonable under the circumstances.”124 In order to provide the 
greatest level of information to potential implementers of a 
standard, the government could predetermine the total royalty 
burden on the standard, and then allocate royalties collected 
among the holders of all identified essential patents on an 
equitable basis.125 
 
122. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
123. See Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212). 
124. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
125. Under the Act, disputes regarding the royalty determination are 
adjudicated by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 35 U.S.C. § 203(b). 
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4. Government Use.  
 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the U.S. government may use or 
manufacture any patented invention without liability for 
patent infringement, provided that it pays “reasonable and 
complete” compensation to the patent holder.126 This provision 
also applies to the “use or manufacture of an invention . . . by a 
contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation 
for the Government and with the authorization or consent of 
the Government.”127 Thus, there is a case to be made that the 
government, in support of the implementation and 
maintenance of the national Smart Grid (a federal mandate 
under EISA), could invoke the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 
for the benefit of all implementers of NIST-recommended 
Smart Grid standards. Then, as with the above proposal 
regarding Federal March-In Rights, the government could 
predetermine the total royalty burden on a particular standard 
and allocate it among all identified essential patents. 
 
5. Compulsory Licensing.  
 
A “compulsory” license permits the use of a patented 
technology without the express permission of the patent holder, 
subject to the payment of compensation to the patent holder. 
Compulsory licenses are common under U.S. copyright law, 
which establishes a widely-used compulsory licensing structure 
for musical compositions. Under U.S. patent law, however, 
there have been few instances of governmental compulsory 
licenses. Nevertheless, provisions authorizing governmental 
compulsory licensing exist under the patent law. For example, 
28 U.S.C. § 1498 represents a statutory “compulsory licensing” 
regime applicable to governmental use of patented 
inventions.128 Two other statutory compulsory licensing 
regimes exist in the U.S. in areas of strong national 
importance: the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes the 
 
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012). Disputes regarding compensation are 
adjudicated by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Id. 
127. Id. (emphasis added). 
128. Id. 
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compulsory licensing of patents “[u]seful in the production or 
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy”129 and 
the Clean Air Act, which authorizes compulsory licensing of 
patents relating to the prevention of air pollution.130 
Compulsory licensing is also expressly authorized under 
international agreements to which the U.S. is a party, 
particularly the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement131 and subsequent Doha 
Declaration, which have been limited to addressing issues of 
access to medicines in the developing world,132 but which could 
have broader applicability to other critical technologies.133 
Given the critical national importance of the Smart Grid, 
Congress may wish to consider an addendum to EISA or other 
legislation creating a compulsory licensing regime with respect 
to the implementation of national Smart Grid standards. 
 
6. Bar on Injunctive Relief. 
 
A different approach that would achieve a result similar to 
that described in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above is legislation 
barring injunctive relief in patent infringement actions against 
implementers of Smart Grid standards. Such a bar would 
effectuate the “public interest” prong of the test for injunctive 
 
129. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183(c) (2012). 
130. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012). 
131. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). Although Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not 
use the term “compulsory licensing,” it speaks to practice of patents “without 
the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or 
third parties authorized by the government . . . .” Id. at 333. 
132. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: 
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation? 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 855-56 (2003); J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to 
Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. & POL. 11, 53 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, 
Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 49, 62 
(2002). 
133. See Cahoy, supra note 16, at 43-44 (suggesting the possibility of 
compulsory licensing in the context of renewable energy and other green 
technologies). 
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relief formulated by the Supreme Court in eBay v. 
MercExchange,134 given the strong national interest in the 
rapid deployment and uninterrupted operation of the Smart 
Grid. Again, fair compensation would be payable to patent 
holders, but the elimination of the injunctive remedy would 
serve to limit the disruptive effect of patent assertions on the 
implementation and operation of the Smart Grid. It is 
significant that in February 2012 three leading information 
technology producers—Microsoft, Apple, and Google—each 
issued public statements indicating that they would forego 
injunctive relief with respect to industry standards subject to 
F/RAND licensing commitments.135 These statements were 
viewed with approval by the DOJ, which relied on them in 
approving Google’s $12 billion acquisition of Motorola Mobility 
and Microsoft’s and Apple’s participation in the consortium 
purchasing a large patent portfolio from bankrupt Nortel 
Networks.136 These statements by three leading technology 
vendors support the need for a broader prohibition on 
injunctive relief as it applies to industry standards, 
particularly in the case of critical infrastructure projects such 
as the Smart Grid. 
 
7. Patent Pools. 
 
As discussed in Section V.A, voluntary patent pools are not 
uncommon among developers of industry standards, and 
 
134. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006) 
(holding that in order to obtain a permanent injunction against use of an 
infringing article, a patent holder must demonstrate “(1) that it has suffered 
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”). 
135. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Statement on 
Decision to Close Investigations of Google’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility 
and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple, Microsoft and Research in 
Motion (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html. For a discussion 
of the companies’ statements and the DOJ statement, see Jorge L. Contreras, 
Guest Post: The February of FRAND, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/february-of-frand.html. 
136. See Contreras, supra note 135. 
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pervasive standards such as CD, DVD, Bluetooth, ATSC, and 
MPEG all rely on pooled patent resources. It would not be 
unreasonable for NIST and/or FERC to encourage the holders 
of patents covering Smart Grid standards to form patent pools 
with a consolidated, reasonable royalty rate available to all 
implementers of the standards. If patent holders are unwilling 
to join such patent pools voluntarily, legislative or regulatory 
solutions could be explored in which participation in such a 
patent pool became a mandatory prerequisite to the sale of 
equipment or technology for the national Smart Grid.137 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Securing the nation’s energy independence, and improving 
the reliability, security, and capacity of the national electric 
grid are urgent national priorities. The Smart Grid, mandated 
by Congress in 2007, can help to achieve these national goals. 
However, the viability of the Smart Grid could be jeopardized 
by the opportunistic enforcement of patents covering key 
standards that ensure the Smart Grid’s interoperability. 
Market-based private solutions have proven ineffective to stem 
the rising tide of patent litigation in standards-intensive 
industries such as telecommunications and semiconductors. 
Thus, in order to ensure the rapid deployment and 
uninterrupted operation of the national Smart Grid, it is 
incumbent upon NIST, FERC, and Congress to implement 
rules that will maximize transparency of the standards-
development process and prevent disruption of this critical 
national resource. 
 
137. Such a mandatory patent pool has not previously been implemented 
in the United States, though some commentators feel that such a result was 
achieved de facto in 1917 through the formation (not least through the efforts 
of then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt) of the 
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association, when disputes among patent holders 
had nearly paralyzed the U.S. aviation industry on the eve of World War I. 
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (Ct. Cl. 1933); see 
Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft 
Association (MAA), 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 646 (1964). 
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